Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
National Institute Economic Review
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Bevan, G.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

RA

Setting Targets for Health Care Performance

Lessons from a Case Study of the English NHS

Gwyn Bevan

London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

This paper examines problems of setting targets for health care performance in which the centre sets a uniform set of targets and levels of performance. The case study examined by the paper is from the system of performance assessment of 'star ratings' that was introduced from 2001 by the Department of Health to give each organisation in the NHS in England a single summary score from zero rating to three stars. Star ratings were directed at holding trusts' chief executives to account for the local delivery of national priorities through a process of 'naming and shaming', in which Chief Executives of zero-rated organisations were at risk of losing their jobs. This paper outlines the underlying model and its three underlying assumptions: the centre can determine a scoring system to prioritise what matters; failures of performance that are not reflected in the scoring system do not matter; and the advantages of a system of scoring on accountable targets outweigh the disadvantages of various types of gaming responses. This paper examines the application of the model of star ratings to a case study of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which are complex organisations with three diverse sets of responsibilities: delivering primary care, commissioning secondary care, and supervising public health. It outlines an alternative model and the issues this raises for governance of health care performance.

Key Words: Performance assessment; Targets; National Health Service; Regulation

National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 197, No. 1, 67-79 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0027950106070036


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
BMJHome page
G. Bevan
Have targets done more harm than good in the English NHS? No
BMJ, January 16, 2009; 338(jan16_2): a3129 - a3129.
[Full Text]


Home page
Journal of Health ManagementHome page
L. Webb and T. Ryan
Hitting the Target and Missing the Point: Is the United Nations Playing Games with the World's most Vulnerable?
Journal of Health Management, January 1, 2009; 11(1): 229 - 241.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of HealthHome page
R. Hamblin
Regulation, measurements and incentives. The experience in the US and UK: does context matter?
Perspectives in Public Health, November 1, 2008; 128(6): 291 - 298.
[Abstract] [PDF]