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Financial Regulation, Credit Risk and Financial Stability

Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science

In contrast to recent successful developments in macro monetary policies, the modelling, measurement and management of systemic financial stability has remained problematical. Indeed, the focus of most effort has been on improving individual, rather than systemic, bank risk management; the Basel II objective has been to bring regulatory bank capital into line with the (sophisticated) banks’ assessment of their own economic capital. Even at the individual bank level there are concerns over (i) appropriate diversification allowances, (ii) differing objectives of banks and regulators, (iii) the need for a buffer over regulatory minima, and (iv) the distinction between expected and unexpected losses (EL and UL). At the systemic level the quite complex and prescriptive content of Basel II raises dangers of ‘endogenous risk’ and procyclicality. Simulations suggest that this latter could be a serious problem.

Key Words: Financial regulation • systemic stability • credit risk • capital adequacy requirements • Basel II • operational risk • internal risk based models • procyclicality • endogenous risk

National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 192, No. 1, 118-127 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/002795010519200111


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